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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GRANT ERCANBRACK, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CRANDALL-WALKER MOTOR 
COMPANY, Inc., 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Case No. 14,298 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the question of whether or not 
a valid contract of sale for the purchase of a pickup truck 
was entered into between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT l ' 
The District Court held that a valid contract had not 
been entered into between the parties and granted Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of the Plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks relief from the Court's granting 
of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and dismissal of plaintiff's Com-
plaint, and seeks judgment against the Defendant for $1,440.30, 
interest, attorney's fees and Court costs. 
- 1 - • 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 25th day of October, 1973, at the Defendant's, 
f 
Crandall-Walker Motor Company, Inc., place of business in Coalville, 
Utah, after some negotiations, Plaintiff signed a "Vehicle Buyer's 
Order" which had been prepared and signed by Gordon Taylor, a 
i 
salesman of the Defendant, for the purchase of a new 1974 Ford 
F-260 pickup truck. (PI. ex. 1) At the time of signing said 
document, the Plaintiff offered to pay a hundred or two hundred 
dollars as a down payment for the truck (Tr. 6, lines 23-29) and 
to leave with the Defendant at that time his 1971 Ford pickup 
which was being traded in on the new truck. However, he was 
I 
informed by the salesman for the Defendant, that it was not 
necessary that he make a payment on the contract and that he 
could use his 1971 Ford pickup until such time as the new vehicle 
arrived. (Tr. 7, lines 21-24) 
For a period of several months the Plaintiff checked 
periodically with the salesman for the Defendant as to when the 
new vehicle would arrive. The salesman for the Defendant repeatedly 
stated to the Plaintiff that the order had been placed with the 
Ford Motor Company and that the truck would be arriving soon. 
In April, 1975, approximately six months after the 
order had been signed, Plaintiff again stopped in at the Defendant's 
place of business in Coalville and talked with Gordon Taylor, 
Defendant's salesman, about said vehicle. Plaintiff observed 
another vehicle similiar to the one he had ordered, but of a 
different color and with different accessories, and discussed with 
Mr. Taylor the possibility of buying that truck in place of the 
or;e he had ordered. He was informed by Mr, Taylor that the truck 
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he ordered would be coming soon and that the Ford Motor Company 
would have to deliver his truck before the "r75?s come out," 
and at the price before the raise. (Tr. 15, lines 14-27) 
On or about May 23, 1974, the salesman for the Defendant 
indicated thai the truck had finally arrived and had everything 
as ordered by the Plaintiff, but that "the company has upped the 
price $400.00 on you." (Tr. 16, lines 24-25) After some discussion 
with the salesman about the price increase, the salesman informed 
the Plaintiff that an officer of the Company was "down in Salt Lake 
right now finding out about this and he will be back tomorrow." 
(Tr. 17, lines 2-3) Plaintiff then agreed to return the following 
day. 
The next day Plaintiff returned and was informed by 
Gordon Taylor, salesman for the Defendant, "itfs going to cost 
you $870.00 over the contract price." (Tr. 18, lines 16-17) 
Plaintiff questioned the increase and indicated that he desired 
to talk with an attorney before proceeding further. 
Plaintiff returned a day or two later and met with 
Junior Crandall, an officer of Defendant company, in an attempt 
to resolve the dispute. Mr. Crandall then informed him that it 
would cost an additional $1,450.00 over the price of the contract 
for the truck. (Tr. 21, lines 15-22) Plaintiff left his 1971 Ford 
pickup truck with the Defendant as the trade-in on the original 
contract and advised Mr. Crandall that he was going to see a lawyer. 
Plaintiff tendered the full contract balance in cash 
to the Defendant (the 1971 pickup truck as a trade-in was already 
in the possession of the Defendant), but the same was refused and 
so an action for specific performance was commenced. (R. 001) 
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< 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that a valid contract 
had not been entered into between the parties because an officer 
i 
of the company had not signed said order. Plaintiff was never 
advised until this time that the order had not been accepted. 
A hearing was held before the Court and Defendant's Motion was 
i 
denied. (R. Oil & 016) 
Prior to a trial on the Complaint for specific perfor-
mance, the Defendant sold said 1975 Ford pickup truck. As a 
i 
result thereof, it became necessary for Plaintiff to purchase 
another pickup truck for an additional cost of $1,440.30, with 
identical equipment. (PI. ex. 7) (Tr. 51, lines 8-13) An Amended 
I 
Complaint was then filed by the Plaintiff seeking damages for 
breech of contract (R. 022) and trial was held on March 6, 1975, 
on the Amended Complaint before the Honorable George E. Ballif, 
I 
Judge, sitting without a jury. Plaintiff and his son testified 
to the foregoing matters, exhibits were offered and received and 
the salesman from whom the Plaintiff purchased a truck was called 
i 
to testify, and as a result of his testimony, Plaintiff's exhibits 
6 and 7 were prepared, introduced and received by the Court. These 
exhibits showed a net difference of $1,440.30 between the Defendant 
I 
contract and the contract for the truck which Plaintiff later 
purchased. Defendant stipulated to said documents being entered 
and that the $1,440,30 was the net difference that the Plaintiff 
I 
Mhad to pay between the two vehicles as a result of these various 
transactions.t? (Tr. 51, lines 12-13) At the conclusion of Plaintiff's 
case, Defendant made a Motion to Dismiss which the Court pro forma 
« 
denied and Defendant then renewed said Motion at the end of the 
trial. The Court having considered said Motion at a later time, 
-4-
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granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at the close of Plaintiff's 
case and ordered that the Complaint be dismissed. (R. 044) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I V 
I 
THE FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE COMPANY, OR AN OFFICER 
OF THE COMPANY, TO ACT (NOTIFY THE PLAINTIFF OF THE NON-ACCEPTANCE 
OF THE CONTRACT) AMOUNTS TO AN AFFIRMANCE OR RATIFICATION OF THE 4 
CONTRACT. 
The undisputed facts of the case show that the Plaintiff 
and the Defendnat's salesman, Gordon Taylor, signed the vehicle 
buyer's order on October 25, 1973. (PI. ex. 1) It was also shown 
that the Plaintiff offered to pay $100.00, or more, on the purchase 
and to leave his pickup truck that was to be traded in on the new 
truck with the Defendant at that time. (Tr. 6, lines 23-29) More-
over, Plaintiff was informed by Defendant's salesman, Gordon Taylor, 
that it was not necessary to make the payment and that it was the 
policy of the Defendant company to allow the purchaser to continue 
to operate his vehicle until the new vehicle arrived. (Tr. 7, lines 
21-24) The undisputed testimony also showed that the Plaintiff 
was never notified that the order had not been accepted by the 
company until an action for specific performance had been commenced. 
The facts further show that approximately 90 days after the order 
had been signed by the Plaintiff, that the salesman, Gordon Taylor, 
informed the Plaintiff that his order had been accepted and had 
been placed with Ford Motor Company. (Tr. 15, lines 19-27) * 
If an officer of the Defendant company had in fact not 
accepted the Plaintiff's order, then he owed a duty to the Plaintiff 
to advise him of that fact. He could not wait six and one-half i 
months to notify the Plaintiff of this non-acceptance, and during 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that time to allow his salesman to tell the Plaintiff that it 
had been accepted. 
Restatement of Agency, Second Page 244, Section 94. 
Failure to Act as Affirmance: 
a. Silence under such circumstances that, 
according to the ordinary experience and habits 
of men, one would naturally be expected to speak 
if he did not consent, is evidence from which 
assent can be inferred. Such inference may be 
made although the purported principal had no 
knowledge that the other party would rely upon 
the supposed authority of the agent; his knowledge 
of such facts, however, coupled with his silence, 
would ordinarily justify an inference of asset 
by him. 
Also 3 AmJur 2nd Page 565-G Agency Section 179-Time 
in which to repudiate unauthorized transaction. 
While a failure promptly to repudiate the agent's 
acts may under some circumstances amount to an 
adoption and ratification thereof, as where a 
failure to repudiate speedily may impose loss or 
injury upon the third person, the rule applicable 
generally is that where an act is done without 
authority, under an assumed agency, it is the duty 
of the principal to disavow and repudiate it in a 
reasonable time after information of the trans-
action if he would avoid responsibility therefor, 
what constitutes a reasonable time must largely, 
if not wholly, depend upon the circumstances of 
the particular case. In any event, however, a 
reasonable time within which to repudiate does 
not mean that the principal is permitted to await 
the issue of an event to transpire in the future, 
with the purpose of adopting the contract if the 
transaction to which it relates proves a paying 
one, and, if not, of rejecting it. If after a 
reasonable time he does not so disaffirm, ratifi-
cation will be presumed, especially if the principal, 
with knowledge of the unauthorized act, remains 
silent or acquiesces therein for a long period of 
time without objection. (Underlining ours.) 
-7-
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POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO NOW DENY THE AGENCY OF 
GORDON TAYLOR TO ENTER INTO THE CONTRACT AND BIND THE COMPANY 
UNDER THE ORDER FORM SIGNED BY HIM AND THE PLAINTIFF ON OCTOBER 25, 
1973. THE COMPANY HAD RATIFIED THE SALESMAN'S ACT IN STATING 
TO THE PLAINTIFF THAT THE ORDER HAD BEfiN ACCEPTED, BY FAILING 
TO TAKE SOME POSITIVE ACTION TO INFORM THE PLAINTIFF TO THE 
CONTRARY. i 
Restatement of Agency, Second Section 103C page 267 & 269, 
Estoppel to Deny Ratification. 
A person may be estopped to deny that he has 
ratified an act or transaction. 
c. The manifestation may be by affirmative conduct, 
as a statement to the third person, or it may 
consist of a failure to act. If a person knows or | 
has reason to know that another has purported to be 
his agent or has simulated him or his act, and 
that a third person has been deceived thereby and 
is likely to act upon his erroneous belief, he must 
take steps to correct the misinformation as would 
be taken by a reasonable person having ordinary | 
regard for the interests of others if he is to 
avoid liability. If he fails to use care to 
undeceive the third person, he becomes subject to 
liability to him as if the facts were as believed 
by him to be, provided the deceived person changed 
his position in reasonable reliance upon their truth. 4 
Also 3 Am Jur 2nd Page 563-4 Agency Section 178 
A principal, after receiving information that an 
act has been done without actual or apparent 
authority by one purporting to act as his agent 4 
on his behalf, is not bound by that act under the 
law of agency unless he ratifies the act; but he 
may and must elect to repudiate or ratify such 
act promptly or at least within a reasonable time. 
He cannot, by holding his pegtce, have the benefit 
of the unauthorized act ofr cbntract if it should"""" | 
afterward' turn out to be profitable, and yet retain 
a right to;repudiate if it otherwise. (Underlining ours. 
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POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT WAS BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THE VEHICLE 
BUYER'S ORDER, EVEN IF AN OFFICER OF THE COMPANY DID NOT SIGN 
SAID ORDER WHERE IT LED THE PLAINTIFF TO BELIEVE THAT THE OFFER 
HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE ACTS OF THE SALESMAN. 
It is fundamental contract law that the parties may 
become bound by the terms of a contract even though they did not 
sign the contract, where they have otherwise indicated their 
acceptance of the contract, or led the other party to so believe 
that they have accepted the contract. (17 AmJur 2nd Section 70, 
pages 408-409) 
A case specifically in point on this matter is the case 
of Albright vs. Stegeman Motor Car Co., (168 Wis. 557, 170 N. W. 
951.) In this case the Plaintiff ordered a vehicle from the 
Defendant on an Order form such as in this case before the Court 
which order contained a clause nthis proposal, if accepted, consti-
tutes a contract, subject to the approval of the Stegeman Motor Car 
Co. at its office in Milwaukee, and must be countersigned by an 
Officer of the company to be valid and in force." The Plaintiff 
attempted to avoid the contract on the basis that the written order 
was never countersigned by an Officer of the company as by its 
express terms. The Court stated: 
it is quite fundamental that parties may become 
bound by the terms of a contract, even though they 
do not sign it, where their intention to do so is 
otherwise indicated. Manifestly, the provision 
requiring the order in question to be countersigned 
by an officer of the compafty was inserted for the 
benefit of the company, and to prevent its liability 
thereon until ratified by someone occupying a posi-
tion of responsibility with the company. If a 
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contracting party may be bound on a contract by 
acts evidencing an intent to that end, we see no 
reason why the provision here under consideration 
could not be waived, or why the company should not, 
by its acts, accept the Order, or become estopped 
to deny its binding force. If the company became 
bound upon the contract, so that it could not resist 
its enforcement by appellant, it acquired the right 
to enforce it against appellant. 
• i 
The testimony of the Plaintiff was that the salesman, 
Gordon Taylor, repeatedly indicated to him that the contract had 
boon accepted, that another salesman for the Defendant company 
also indicated that the contract had been accepted and placed with 
the Ford Motor Company, and further that an officer of the company, 
Junior Crandall, when questioned by the Plaintiff as to when the 
i 
truck would arrive, led the Plaintiff to believe that the order 
had been accepted and that the truck would be arriving soon. It 
Wjas only when tjie Defendant attempted to require the Plaintiff to 
I 
pay additional money for the truck that anyone connected with the 
Defendant company made any indication that the contract was not 
binding upon both parties. The Plaintiff at all times understood 
the contract to be binding upon him and waited six and one-half 
months for th<? truck and refrained from purchasing another truck 
during this time to his detriment. 
i 
I 
< 
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POINT IV 
IT WAS NEVER INTENDED THAT THE COPY OF THE "VEHICLE 
BUYER'S ORDER" GIVEN TO THE PLAINTIFF WOULD BE ACCEPTED IN 
WRITING BY AN OFFICER OF THE COMPANY, AND THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT 
IS BOUND BY THE ORDER SIGNED BY ITS SALESMAN AND THE PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff testified that upon the signing of the 
Vehicle Buyer's Order by the salesman and himself, that he was 
bound by the agreement and therefore both parties would be obligated 
to comply with the agreement. (Tr. 50, lines 8-12) 
Mr. Crandall testified that the salesman, Gordon Taylor, 
was authorized, and would have been the one to notify the Plaintiff 
of the acceptance of the Order by the company. The salesman did 
in fact notify Plaintiff of the acceptance. 
If the salesman was doing something he was authorized 
to do, then the company was bound by his acts, and cannot now say 
that the salesman made a mistake. 
-11-
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CONCLUSION 
In this action the contract was purportedly destroyed 
in a fire. The only evidence to show that it had not been accepted 
was the testimony of Mr. Crandall, one of the officers of the 
company. However, several months after the order had been signed, 
the salesman informed the Plaintiff that the order had been accepted, 
and an order placed. In May, 1974, when the pickup truck which 
Plaintiff had ordered, arrived with all the equipment as ordered 
by the Plaintiff, the salesman informed Plaintiff that this was 
the truck he had ordered, that all of the equipment was on it, and 
the only problem was that Ford Motor Company had raised the price 
of the truck by $400.00. When Plaintiff refused to pay the $400.00 
increase, the price was raised to $870.00, and when Plaintiff 
further refused to pay this additional sum, then the price was 
I 
raised an additional $1,450.00 over and above the contract price. 
(Tr. 18, lines 12-21) and (Tr. 21, lines 15-22) It was only when 
the Plaintiff refused to pay the increase and commenced an action 
I 
for specific performance that the Defendant then alleged that the 
Vehicle Buyer's Order had not been accepted by an officer of the 
company. 
I 
It would be manifestly unjust to allow the Defendant, 
by its salesman, to inform the Plaintiff that the order had been 
accepted, that the truck would be there soon, make repeated state-
I 
ments to this effect, show the Plaintiff the truck when it came 
in, and represent that this was the truck with all the accessories 
as ordered, with the Plaintiff relying on these representations 
and then six and one-half months later when the Plaintiff will not 
pay additional money, to state that the order had not been sigped 
-12-
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by an officer of the company so that the Defendant can now sell 
the truck for more money. This case seem to fit squarely with the 
principal enumciated in 3 AmJur 2nd 479-481, Section 76: 
Stated in terms of estoppel, the rule is that 
where a principal has, by his voluntary act, 
placed an agent in such a situation that a 
person of ordinary prudence conversant with 
business is justified in assuming that such 
agent has authority to perform a particular act 
and deals with the agent upon that assumption, 
the principal is estopped as against such third 
person from denying the agent's authority; he 
will not be permitted to prove that the agent's 
authority was, in fact, less extensive than 
that with which he was apparently clothed. 
This rule had been based upon the principle that 
where one of two innocent parties must suffer 
from the wrongful act of another, the loss should 
fall upon the one who, by his conduct, created 
the circumstances which enabled the third party 
to perpetrate the wrong and cause the loss. 
The record and the testimony shows that Mr. Ercanbrack 
suffered damages in a sum of $1,440.30, plus interest, Attorney's 
fees and Court costs, and the Motion to Dismiss should be overruled 
and judgment should be granted to him accordingly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD L. MAXFIELD, for: 
MAXFIELD, GAMMON, ELLIS & DALEBOUT 
28 North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 1097 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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